{"product_id":"designing-federalism-a-theory-of-self-sustainable-federal-institutions","title":"Designing Federalism: A Theory of Self-Sustainable Federal Institutions","description":"Mikhail Filippov, Peter C. Ordeshook, Olga Shvetsova\u003cbr\u003eCambridge University Press\u003cbr\u003eEdition: Illustrated, 1\/12\/2004\u003cbr\u003eEAN 9780521816182, ISBN10: 0521816181\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eHardcover, 396 pages, 22.9 x 16.2 x 3 cm\u003cbr\u003eLanguage: English\u003cbr\u003eOriginally published in English\u003cp\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eBecause of the redistributive nature of institutions and the availability of implementable alternatives with different distributive consequences, the desire of federation members to change institutional specifics in their favor is a permanent feature of the federal political process. This is so for two reasons. First, states or their equivalents in democratic federations usually can succeed in renegotiating the rules if they feel sufficiently motivated to do so. Second, in the case of a federation it is more or less clear who stands to benefit from any change in institutions. Thus, the existence of an equilibrium of constitutional legitimacy at the popular and elite levels cannot be taken for granted. The authors show that the presence in the political process of agents who are 'naturally committed' to the status-quo institutional arrangement can suffice to coordinate voters to act as if they support existing constitutional arrangements.\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e1. Federations and the theoretical problem\u003cbr\u003e1.1 Why Federalism\u003cbr\u003e1.2 Definitions\u003cbr\u003e1.3 The long search for stability\u003cbr\u003eFederalism as nuisance\u003cbr\u003eFederalism as engine of prosperity\u003cbr\u003eRiker as intermediary\u003cbr\u003e1.4 The fundamental problem of stability\u003cbr\u003e1.5 Basic premises and conclusions\u003cbr\u003e2. Federal bargaining\u003cbr\u003e2.1 Alliances versus federations\u003cbr\u003e2.2 The private character of public goods\u003cbr\u003e2.3 Equilibrium selection and redistribution\u003cbr\u003e2.4 The 'federal problem'\u003cbr\u003e2.5 Bargaining for control of the center\u003cbr\u003e2.6 Allocating jurisdictions\u003cbr\u003e2.7 Three levels of institutional design\u003cbr\u003e3. Two cases of uninstitutionalized bargaining\u003cbr\u003e3.1 The Czechoslovak dissolution\u003cbr\u003e3.2 The Soviet dissolution\u003cbr\u003e3.3 The feasibility of success in initial bargaining\u003cbr\u003e3.4 Secession\u003cbr\u003ethe special road to renegotiation\u003cbr\u003e4. Representation\u003cbr\u003e4.1 Two alternative models of Federalism\u003cbr\u003e4.2 A national venue for bargaining\u003cbr\u003e4.3 Within versus without\u003cbr\u003e4.4 Direct versus delegated representation\u003cbr\u003e4.5 Other parameters of design\u003cbr\u003e4.6 Bilateral decision making and the case of Russia\u003cbr\u003e5. Incentives\u003cbr\u003e5.1 Institutional enforcement\u003cbr\u003e5.2 The court\u003cbr\u003e5.3 Some simple rules of constitutional design\u003cbr\u003e5.4 Voters versus elites\u003cbr\u003e5.5 Desirable imperfection and a democratic as if principle\u003cbr\u003e6. Political parties in a federal state\u003cbr\u003e6.1 An extreme hypothesis\u003cbr\u003e6.2 Parties in a democracy\u003cbr\u003e6.3 The idealized party system\u003cbr\u003e6.4 Integrated parties\u003cbr\u003e6.5 Integration outside the United States\u003cbr\u003eAustralian Federalism and the role of parties\u003cbr\u003eCanada\u003cbr\u003e6.6 India\u003cbr\u003eLeadership incentives\u003cbr\u003eRank and file incentives\u003cbr\u003eThe party and Federalism\u003cbr\u003e1967 and thereafter\u003cbr\u003e7. Institutional sources of federal stability I\u003cbr\u003e7.1 Introduction\u003cbr\u003e7.2 Level 2 and the federalist\u003cbr\u003e7.3 Level 3 institutions\u003cbr\u003e7.4 Australia, Canada, Germany, and India revisited\u003cbr\u003eGermany\u003cbr\u003eCanada\u003cbr\u003eCanada vs Australia and India\u003cbr\u003e7.3 Local and regional design parameters\u003cbr\u003e8. Institutional sources of federal stability II\u003cbr\u003e8.1 Electoral mechanisms and societal structures\u003cbr\u003eRepresentation\u003cbr\u003eEthnicity\u003cbr\u003eDefining federal subjects\u003cbr\u003eNumber of local jurisdictions\u003cbr\u003eAuthority over local governments\u003cbr\u003e8.2 Bicameralism\u003cbr\u003eSymmetry\u003cbr\u003ePresidential authority\u003cbr\u003ePresidential selection\u003cbr\u003eElectoral connections\u003cbr\u003e8.3 Level 1 and the scope of the federal mandate\u003cbr\u003e8.4 Level 0 - things beyond design\u003cbr\u003e9. Designing Federalism\u003cbr\u003e9.1 Russia\u003cbr\u003eElectoral arrangements\u003cbr\u003eRegional autonomy\u003cbr\u003eConstitutional matters\u003cbr\u003eParties and the current status quo\u003cbr\u003e9.2 The European Union\u003cbr\u003eBackground\u003cbr\u003eThe role of parties\u003cbr\u003eThe puzzle of the collusion\u003cbr\u003eFrance versus Britain\u003cbr\u003eEU institutional design\u003cbr\u003e9.4 Conclusion.\u003c\/p\u003e","brand":"Cambridge University Press","offers":[{"title":"Unused and unread, noticeable cosmetic issue such as creases or knocks.  Dust Jacket missing. Stamped 'damaged' by publisher to a non-text page. 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