Controlling Institutions: International Organizations and the Global Economy
Cambridge University Press
Edition: Illustrated, 3/3/2011
EAN 9781107005402, ISBN10: 110700540X
Hardcover, 274 pages, 22.9 x 15.2 x 1.9 cm
Language: English
How is the United States able to control the IMF with only 17 per cent of the votes? How are the rules of the global economy made? This book shows how a combination of formal and informal rules explains how international organizations really work. Randall W. Stone argues that formal rules apply in ordinary times, while informal power allows leading states to exert control when the stakes are high. International organizations are therefore best understood as equilibrium outcomes that balance the power and interests of the leading state and the member countries. Presenting a new model of institutional design and comparing the IMF, WTO, and EU, Stone argues that institutional variations reflect the distribution of power and interests. He shows that US interests influence the size, terms, and enforcement of IMF programs, and new data, archival documents, and interviews reveal the shortcomings of IMF programs in Mexico, Russia, Korea, Indonesia, and Argentina.
1. Introduction
international organization and US power
Part I. Theory
2. A theory of international organization
3. A model of informal governance
Part II. Cases
4. Informal governance in the IMF
5. The World Trade Organization
6. The European Union
Part III. Hypotheses
7. Access to IMF resources
8. Conditionality under IMF programs
9. Enforcement
10. Conclusions.