Handbook of Spectrum Auction Design

Cambridge University Press, 10/26/2017
EAN 9781107135345, ISBN10: 1107135346

Hardcover, 932 pages, 26.2 x 18.3 x 5.6 cm
Language: English

Following the successful PCS Auction conducted by the US Federal Communications Commission in 1994, auctions have replaced traditional ways of allocating valuable radio spectrum, a key resource for any mobile telecommunications operator. Spectrum auctions have raised billions of dollars worldwide and have become a role model for market-based approaches in the public and private sectors. The design of spectrum auctions is a central application of game theory and auction theory due to its importance in industry and the theoretical challenges it presents. Several auction formats have been developed with different properties addressing fundamental questions about efficiently selling multiple objects to a group of buyers. This comprehensive handbook features classic papers and new contributions by international experts on all aspects of spectrum auction design, including pros and cons of different auctions and lessons learned from theory, experiments, and the field, providing a valuable resource for regulators, telecommunications professionals, consultants, and researchers.

Preface
Part I. The Simultaneous Ascending Auction
1. Putting auction theory to work
the simultaneous ascending auction
2. An equilibrium analysis of the simultaneous ascending auction
3. The efficiency of the FCC spectrum auctions
4. Measuring the efficiency of an FCC spectrum auction
Part II. The Combinatorial Clock Auction Formats
5. Combinatorial auction design
6. The clock-proxy auction
a practical combinatorial auction design
7. Spectrum auction design
8. A practical guide to the combinatorial clock auction
9. Market design and the evolution of the combinatorial clock auction
10. Quadratic core-selecting payment rules for combinatorial auctions
11. Core-selecting package auctions
12. A new payment rule for core-selecting package auctions
13. On the impossibility of core-selecting auctions
14. Ascending combinatorial auctions with risk averse bidders
15. Properties of the combinatorial clock auction
16. Budget constraints combinatorial clock auctions
17. (Un)expected bidder behavior in spectrum auctions
about inconsistent bidding and its impact on efficiency in the combinatorial clock auction
Part III. Alternative Auction Designs
18. A combinatorial auction mechanism for airport time slot allocation
19. A new and improved design for multiobject iterative auctions
20. Hierarchical package bidding
a paper and pencil combinatorial auction
21. Assignment messages and exchanges
22. The product-mix auction
a new auction design for differentiated goods
23. The continuous combinatorial auction architecture
24. Coalition-based pricing in ascending combinatorial auctions
Part IV. Experimental Comparisons of Auction Designs
25. Experiments testing multiobject allocation mechanisms
26. Laboratory experimental testbeds
application to the PCS auction
27. An experimental test of flexible combinatorial spectrum auction formats
28. On the impact of package selection in combinatorial auctions
an experimental study in the context of spectrum auction design
29. Do core-selecting combinatorial clock auctions always lead to high efficiency? An experimental analysis of spectrum auction designs
30. Spectrum auction design
simple auctions for complex sales
Part V. The Bidders' Perspective
31. Winning play in spectrum auctions
32. Up in the air
GTE's experience in the MTA auction for personal communication services licenses
33. Bidding complexities in the combinatorial clock auction
34. Strategic bidding in combinatorial clock auctions – a bidder perspective
35. Impact of budget-contraints on the efficiency of multi-lot spectrum auctions
Part VI. Secondary Markets and Exchanges
36. Spectrum markets
motivation, challenges, and implications
37. Designing the US incentive auction
38. Solving the station repacking problem
39. ICE
an expressive iterative combinatorial exchange
40. ACE
a combinatorial market mechanism
Outlook.