Moral Disagreement (Cambridge Studies in Philosophy)
Cambridge University Press, 4/27/2006
EAN 9780521853385, ISBN10: 0521853389
Hardcover, 160 pages, 22.9 x 15.2 x 1.3 cm
Language: English
Folke Tersman explores what we can learn about the nature of moral thinking by examining moral disagreement. He explains how diversity of opinion on moral issues undermines the idea that moral convictions can be objectively valued. Arguments on moral thinking are often criticized for not being able to explain why there is a contrast between ethics and other areas in which there is disagreement, but where one does not give up the idea of an objective truth, as in the natural sciences. Tersman shows that the contrast has to do with facts about when, and on what basis, moral convictions can be correctly attributed to an agent or speaker.
Preface
1. Realism and irrealism
2. The case for radical moral disagreement
3. Explaining and predicting disagreement
4. The argument from inaccessibility
5. The argument from ambiguity
6. Attributing moral judgments
References
Index.