Social Goals and Social Organization: Essays in Memory of Elisha Pazner

Cambridge University Press, 2/6/1986
EAN 9780521262040, ISBN10: 0521262046

Hardcover, 380 pages, 23.4 x 15.2 x 2.6 cm
Language: English

Published as a tribute to the memory of Elisha Pazner, this book contains a collection of essays providing a comprehensive view of the design and evaluation of economic mechanisms, written and edited by the major contributors to the field. Amongst the topics included are bargaining theory and the economics of competitive bidding. The surveys are preceded by 'A Perspective', by Leo Hurwicz which contains a systematic account of the development of the literature on mechanism design, and this provides a context for both the surveys and the six published papers authored or co-authored by Elisha Pazner that complete the book and demonstrate Pazner's interest in and contribution to the study of economic mechanisms. Leonid Hurwitcz is the Nobel Prize Winner 2007 for The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel, along with colleagues Eric Maskin and Roger Myerson, for his work on the effectiveness of markets.

Elisha A. Pazner
Editors' preface
List of contributors
1. A perspective Leonid Hurwicz
Part 1. The Surveys
2. Axioms for social welfare orderings Claude d'Aspremont
3. Solutions to the bargaining problem Ehud Kalai
4. Theories of justice based on symmetry William Thomson and Hal R. Varian
5. Strategy-proofness
the existence of dominant-strategy mechanisms Eitan Muller and Mark A. Satterthwaite
6. The theory of implementation in Nash equilibrium
a survey Eric S. Maskin
7. Implementation via Nash equilibria in economic environments Andrew Postlewaite
8. Bayesian equilibrium and incentive-compatibility
an introduction Roger B. Myerson
9. The economics of competitive bidding
a selective survey Paul R. Milgrom
Part II. Six Papers by Elisha A. Pazner
10. A difficulty in the concept of fairness (with David Schmeidler)
11. Recent thinking on economic justice
12. Social contract theory and ordinal distributive equity (with David Schmeidler)
13. Pitfalls in the theory of fairness
14. Cheatproofness properties of the plurality rule in large societies (with Eugene Wesley)
15. Egalitarian equivalent allocations
a new concept of economic equity (with David Schmeidler)
Author index
Subject index.