A Minimal Metaphysics for Scientific Practice
Cambridge University Press, 7/1/2021
EAN 9781316519394, ISBN10: 1316519392
Hardcover, 256 pages, 22.9 x 15.2 x 1.4 cm
Language: English
Originally published in English
What are the metaphysical commitments which best 'make sense' of our scientific practice (rather than our scientific theories)? In this book, Andreas Hüttemann provides a minimal metaphysics for scientific practice, i.e. a metaphysics that refrains from postulating any structure that is explanatorily irrelevant. Hüttemann closely analyses paradigmatic aspects of scientific practice, such as prediction, explanation and manipulation, to consider the questions whether and (if so) what metaphysical presuppositions best account for these practices. He looks at the role which scientific generalisation (laws of nature) play in predicting, testing, and explaining the behaviour of systems. He also develops a theory of causation in terms of quasi-inertial processes and interfering factors, and he proposes an account of reductive practices that makes minimal metaphysical assumptions. His book will be valuable for scholars and advanced students working in both philosophy of science and metaphysics.
Introduction
1. Laws of nature and their modal surface structure
2. The problem of ceteris paribus clauses
3. Causation – conceptual groundwork
4. Causation – application and augmentation
5. Reductive practices
6. Reduction and physical foundationalism
7. Reduction and ontological monism
8. Concluding remarks
methods and epistemic sources in metaphysics.