A Short Course in Intermediate Microeconomics with Calculus
Cambridge University Press
Edition: 2, 11/22/2018
EAN 9781108439190, ISBN10: 1108439195
Paperback, 428 pages, 25.4 x 20.4 x 1.8 cm
Language: English
This second edition retains the positive features of being clearly written, well organized, and incorporating calculus in the text, while adding expanded coverage on game theory, experimental economics, and behavioural economics. It remains more focused and manageable than similar textbooks, and provides a concise yet comprehensive treatment of the core topics of microeconomics, including theories of the consumer and of the firm, market structure, partial and general equilibrium, and market failures caused by public goods, externalities and asymmetric information. The book includes helpful solved problems in all the substantive chapters, as well as over seventy new mathematical exercises and enhanced versions of the ones in the first edition. The authors make use of the book's full color with sharp and helpful graphs and illustrations. This mathematically rigorous textbook is meant for students at the intermediate level who have already had an introductory course in microeconomics, and a calculus course.
1. Introduction
Part I. Theory of the Consumer
2. Preferences and utility
3. The budget constraint and the consumer's optimal choice
4. Demand functions
5. Supply functions for labor and savings
6. Welfare economics 1
the one-person case
7. Welfare economics 2
the many-person case
Part II. Theory of the Producer
8. Theory of the firm 1
the single-input model
9. Theory of the firm 2
the long run, multiple-input model
10. Theory of the firm 3
the short run, multiple-input model
Part III. Partial Equilibrium
Market Structure
11. Perfectly competitive markets
12. Monopoly and monopolistic competition
13. Duopoly
14. Game theory
Part IV. General Equilibrium
15. An exchange economy
16. A production economy
Part V. Market Failure
17. Externalities
18. Public goods
19. Uncertainty and expected utility
20. Uncertainty and asymmetric information.