American Grand Strategy in the Mediterranean during World War II
Cambridge University Press, 2/10/2014
EAN 9781107044142, ISBN10: 1107044146
Hardcover, 324 pages, 23.1 x 15.7 x 2.8 cm
Language: English
This book offers a thorough reinterpretation of US engagement with the Mediterranean during World War II. Andrew Buchanan argues that the United States was far from being a reluctant participant in a 'peripheral' theater, and that Washington had a major grand-strategic interest in the region. By the end of the war the Mediterranean was essentially an American lake, and the United States had substantial political and economic interests extending from North Africa, via Italy and the Balkans, to the Middle East. This book examines the military, diplomatic, and economic processes by which this hegemonic position was assembled and consolidated. It discusses the changing character of the Anglo-American alliance, the establishment of post-war spheres of influence, the nature of presidential leadership, and the common interest of all the leaders of the 'Grand Alliance' in blocking the development of potentially revolutionary movements emerging from the chaos of war, occupation, and economic breakdown.
Introduction
1. 'The president's personal policy'
2. The decision for Torch
3. Keeping Spain out of the war
Washington's appeasement of Franco
4. Torch, Darlan, and the French Maghreb
5. 'The intricacies of colonial rule'
6. 'Senior partners?'
7. 'An investment for the future'
8. The Tehran Conference and the Anglo-American struggle over the invasion of southern France
9. Helping De Gaulle get his 'talons pretty deeply dug into France'
10. Italy 'enters the postwar period'
11. Spain, Wolfram, and the 'liberal turn'
12. The Culbertson Mission and the open door
13. 'Balkan-phobia?' The United States, Yugoslavia, and Greece, 1940–5
14. 'We have become Mediterraneanites'.
'This book is a fine piece of research and analysis. Scholars of World War II, US diplomatic history, and twentieth-century international relations will all find much of value, and general readers and university students will also want to give close attention to Buchanan's work. Buchanan does an excellent job of showing the importance of the Mediterranean military-diplomatic-economic theater as it developed from 1940 to the early Cold War. Through this, he has produced a major work of research and interpretation on a vitally important subject.' David Mayers, Boston University