Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers: 33 (Cambridge Studies in International Relations, Series Number 33)
Cambridge University Press, 3/10/1994
EAN 9780521466219, ISBN10: 0521466210
Paperback, 262 pages, 22.9 x 15.2 x 1.7 cm
Language: English
This book examines a question generally neglected in the study of international relations: why does a militarily and economically less powerful state initiate conflict against a relatively strong state? T. V. Paul analyses this phenomenon by focusing on the strategic and political considerations, domestic and international, which influence a weaker state to initiate war against a more powerful adversary. The key argument of deterrence theory is that the military superiority of the status quo power, coupled with a credible retaliatory threat, will prevent attack by challengers. The author challenges this assumption by examining six twentieth-century asymmetric wars, from the Japanese offensive against Russia in 1904 to the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands in 1982. The book's findings have wide implications for the study of war, power, deterrence, coercive diplomacy, strategy, arms races, and alliances.
Part I. Theoretical Framework
1. Introduction
war initiation in international relations theory
2. Explaining war initiation by weaker powers in asymmetric conflicts
Part II. The Case Studies
3. The Japanese offensive against Russia, 1904
4. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, 1941
5. The Chinese intervention in Korea, 1950
6. The Pakistani offensive in Kashmir, 1965
7. The Egyptian offensive in the Sinai, 1973
8. The Argentine invasion of the Falklands/Malvinas, 1982
9. Conclusion.