Bargaining over the Bomb: The Successes and Failures of Nuclear Negotiations
Cambridge University Press, 2/21/2019
EAN 9781108701846, ISBN10: 1108701841
Paperback, 224 pages, 23.6 x 22.9 x 1.3 cm
Language: English
Can nuclear agreements like the Iran deal work? This book develops formal bargaining models to show that they can over time, despite apparent incentives to cheat. Existing theories of nuclear proliferation fail to account for the impact of bargaining on the process. William Spaniel explores how credible agreements exist in which rival states make concessions to convince rising states not to proliferate and argues in support of nuclear negotiations as effective counter-proliferation tools. This book proves not only the existence of settlements but also the robustness of the inefficiency puzzle. In addition to examining existing agreements, the model used by Spaniel serves as a baseline for modeling other concerns about nuclear weapons.
Introduction
1. How are nuclear weapons special? 2. The theory of butter-for-bombs agreements
how potential power coerces concessions
3. Does nuclear proficiency induce compliance? 4. The diplomacy of butter-for-bombs agreements
5. Arms treaties and the changing credibility of preventive war
6. You get what you give
endogenous nuclear reversal
7. Preventive strikes
when states call the wrong 'bluff'
8. Lessons learned.