Cases in European Competition Policy: The Economic Analysis

Cambridge University Press, 8/27/2009
EAN 9780521713504, ISBN10: 0521713501

Paperback, 512 pages, 24.4 x 17 x 2.6 cm
Language: English

Competition between firms is usually the most effective way of delivering economic efficiency and what consumers want. However, there is a balance to be struck. Firms must not be over-regulated and so hampered in their development of innovative products and new strategies to compete for customers. Nor must they be completely free to satisfy a natural preference for monopoly, which would give them higher profits and a quieter life. The economic role of competition policy (control of anticompetitive agreements, mergers and abusive practices) is to maintain this balance, and an effective policy requires a nuanced understanding of the economics of industrial organization. Cases in European Competition Policy demonstrates how economics is used (and sometimes abused) in competition cases in practical competition policy across Europe. Each chapter summarizes a real case investigated by the European Commission or a national authority, and provides a critique of key aspects of the economic analysis.

List of figures
List of tables
List of contributors
Preface
Introduction
the transformation of competition policy in Europe Bruce Lyons
Part I. Anticompetitive Behaviour by Firms with Market Power
Introduction
Section 1. Abuse of a Dominant Position
1. Michelin II
the treatment of rebates Massimo Motta
2. Interoperability and market foreclosure in the European Microsoft case Kai-Uwe Kühn and John Van Reenen
Section 2. Market Investigations
3. Mobile call termination in the UK
a competitive bottleneck? Mark Armstrong and Julian Wright
4. Relationship between buyer and seller power in retailing
UK supermarkets (2000) Paul Dobson
Part II. Agreements Between Firms
Introduction
Section 1. Cartels
5. The graphite electrodes cartel
fines which deter? Morten Hviid and Andreas Stephan
6. Assessment of damages in the district heating pipe cartel Peter Møllgaard
Section 2. Other Horizontal Agreements
7. Interchange fees in payment card systems
price remedies in a two-sided market Jean-Charles Rochet
8. The orders and rules of British horseracing
anticompetitive agreements or good governance of a multi-sided sport? Bruce Lyons
Section 3. Vertical Agreements
9. Efficiency enhancing or anticompetitive vertical restraints? Selective and exclusive car distribution in Europe Frank Verboven
10. Beer - the ties that bind Michael Waterson
11. Parallel trade of prescription medicines
the Glaxo dual pricing case Patrick Rey and James Venit
Part III. Mergers
Introduction
Section 1. Measurement of Unilateral Effects
12. A merger in the insurance industry
much easier to measure unilateral effects than expected Christian Gollier and Marc Ivaldi
13. Merger simulations of unilateral effects
what can we learn from the UK brewing industry? Margaret Slade
Section 2. Coordinated Effects
14. The ups and downs of the doctrine of collective dominance
sing game theory for merger policy Eliana Garces-Tolon, Damien Neven and Paul Seabright
15. Capacity constraints and irreversible investments
defending against collective dominance in UPM Kymmene/Norske Skog/Haindl Kai-Uwe Kühn and John Van Reenen
Section 3. Vertical and Conglomerate Effects
16. Vertical effects between natural gas and electricity production
the Neste/IVO merger in Finland Rune Stenbacka
17. Horizontal, vertical and conglomerate effects
the GE/Honeywell merger in the EU Xavier Vives and Gianandrea Staffiero
Index.