Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining

Cambridge University Press, 2/13/1986
EAN 9780521267571, ISBN10: 0521267579

Hardcover, 404 pages, 22.8 x 15.2 x 2.7 cm
Language: English

Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining provides a comprehensive picture of the new developments in bargaining theory. It especially shows the way the use of axiomatic models has been complemented by the new results derived from strategic models. The papers in this volume are edited versions of those given at a conference on Game Theoretic Models of Bargaining held at the University of Pittsburgh. There are two distinct reasons why the study of bargaining is of fundamental importance in economics. The first is that many aspects of economic activity are directly influenced by bargaining between and among individuals, firms, and nations. The second is that bargaining occupies an important place in economic theory, since the 'pure bargaining problem' is at the opposite pole of economic phenomena from the case of 'perfect competition'. This volume is an outgrowth of the renewed interest in the strategic approach to the theory of bargaining and to the general theory of non-cooperative games.

Preface
1. Editor's introduction and overview Alvin E. Roth
2. Disagreement in bargaining
models with incomplete information Kalyan Chatterjee
3. Reputations in games and markets Robert Wilson
4. An approach to some noncooperative game situations with special attention to bargaining Robert W. Rosenthal
5. Infinite-horizon models of bargaining with one-sided incomplete information Drew Fudenberg, David Levine and Jean Tirole
6. Choice of conjectures in a bargaining game with incomplete information Ariel Rubinstein
7. Analysis of two bargaining problems with incomplete information Roger B. Myerson
8. Sequential bargaining mechanisms Peter C. Cramton
9. The role of risk aversion in a simple bargaining model Martin J. Osborne
10. Risk sensitivity and related properties for bargaining solutions Stef Tijs and Hans Peters
11. Axiomatic theory of bargaining with a variable population
a survey of recent results William Thomson
12. Toward a focal-point theory of bargaining Alvin E. Roth
13. Bargaining and coalitions K. G. Binmore
14. Axiomatic approaches to coalitional bargaining Sergiu Hart
15. A comment on the Coase theorem William Samuelson
16. Disclosure of evidence and resolution of disputes
who should bear the burden of proof? Joel Sobel
17. The role of arbitration and the theory of incentives Vincent P. Crawford.