Kant's Defense of Common Moral Experience: A Phenomenological Account (Modern European Philosophy)
Cambridge University Press, 7/18/2013
EAN 9781107033580, ISBN10: 1107033586
Hardcover, 309 pages, 23.1 x 15 x 2.3 cm
Language: English
Originally published in English
In this book, Jeanine Grenberg argues that everything important about Kant's moral philosophy emerges from careful reflection upon the common human moral experience of the conflict between happiness and morality. Through careful readings of both the Groundwork and the Critique of Practical Reason, Grenberg shows that Kant, typically thought to be an overly technical moral philosopher, in fact is a vigorous defender of the common person's first-personal encounter with moral demands. Grenberg uncovers a notion of phenomenological experience in Kant's account of the Fact of Reason, develops a new a reading of the Fact, and grants a moral epistemic role for feeling in grounding Kant's a priori morality. The book thus challenges readings which attribute only a motivational role to feeling; and Fichtean readings which violate Kant's commitments to the limits of reason. This study will be valuable to students and scholars engaged in Kant studies.
Introduction
getting Kant's joke
a phenomenological defense of common moral experience
Part I. The Interpretive Framework
1. Kant's common, phenomenological grounding of morality
2. Response to immediate objections
experience
3. Response to immediate objections
feeling
Part II. The Groundwork
4. Kant's Groundwork rejection of the possibility of a reliable experience of categorical obligation
5. The phenomenological failure of Groundwork III
Part III. The Critique of Practical Reason
6. Recent interpretations of the Fact of Reason
7. The gallows man
the new face of attentiveness
8. The Fact of Reason is a forced, phenomenological fact
9. The gallows man's fact is the Fact of Reason
10. Thoughts on the deduction of freedom
11. Objective, synthetic, a priori, practical cognitions
Conclusion.