The Sensitivity Principle in Epistemology
Cambridge University Press, 8/2/2012
EAN 9781107004238, ISBN10: 1107004233
Hardcover, 294 pages, 22.9 x 15.2 x 1.7 cm
Language: English
The sensitivity principle is a compelling idea in epistemology and is typically characterized as a necessary condition for knowledge. This collection of thirteen new essays constitutes a state-of-the-art discussion of this important principle. Some of the essays build on and strengthen sensitivity-based accounts of knowledge and offer novel defences of those accounts. Others present original objections to sensitivity-based accounts (objections that must be taken seriously even by those who defend enhanced versions of sensitivity) and offer comprehensive analysis and discussion of sensitivity's virtues and problems. The resulting collection will stimulate new debate about the sensitivity principle and will be of great interest and value to scholars and advanced students of epistemology.
Preface
1. The resilience of sensitivity Kelly Becker and Tim Black
Part I. Defenses, Applications, Explications
2. Nozick's defense of closure Peter Baumann
3. Sensitivity meets explanation
an improved counterfactual condition on knowledge Peter Murphy and Tim Black
4. Sensitivity from others Sanford Goldberg
5. Knowledge, cognitive dispositions and conditionals Lars Bo Gundersen
6. Methods and how to individuate them Kelly Becker
Part II. Criticism
7. Truth-tracking and the value of knowledge Jonathan Kvanvig
8. The enduring trouble with tracking Jonathan Vogel
9. What makes knowledge the most highly prized form of true belief? Peter Klein
Part III. In Favor of Safety over Sensitivity
10. In defence of modest anti-luck epistemology Duncan Pritchard
11. Better safe than sensitive John Greco
12. False negatives Steven Luper
Part IV. Sensitivity without Subjunctives
13. Roush on knowledge
tracking redux Anthony Brueckner
14. Sensitivity and closure Sherrilyn Roush.