Controlling Governments: Voters, Institutions, and Accountability (Cambridge Studies in the Theory of Democracy)

Controlling Governments: Voters, Institutions, and Accountability (Cambridge Studies in the Theory of Democracy)

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Cambridge University Press, 1/31/2008
EAN 9780521711104, ISBN10: 052171110X

Paperback, 326 pages, 22.7 x 15.1 x 2 cm
Language: English

How much influence do citizens have to control the government? What guides voters at election time? Why do governments survive? How do institutions modify the power of the people over politicians? The book combines academic analytical rigor with comparative analysis to identify how much information voters must have to select a politician for office, or for holding a government accountable; whether parties in power can help voters to control their governments; how different institutional arrangements influence voters' control; why politicians choose particular electoral systems; and what economic and social conditions may undermine not only governments, but democracy. Arguments are backed by vast macro and micro empirical evidence. There are cross-country comparisons and survey analyses of many countries. In every case there has been an attempt to integrate analytical arguments and empirical research. The goal is to shed new light on perplexing questions of positive democratic theory.

1. Explaining the electoral performance of incumbents in democracies Belén Barreiro
2. How can governments be accountable if voters vote ideologically? Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca
3. Enduring ethnicity
the political survival of incumbent ethnic parties in western democracies Sonia Alonso
4. Performance or representation? The determinants of voting in complex political contexts Paloma Aguilar and Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca
5. Political knowledge and the logic of voting
a comparative study Marta Fraile
6. The political consequences of internal party democracy José María Maravall
7. Choosing rules for government
the institutional preferences of early Socialist parties Alberto Penadés
8. Constitutions and democratic breakdowns Alicia Adserá and Carles Boix.