Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment

Cambridge University Press, 9/5/2002
EAN 9780521796798, ISBN10: 0521796792

Paperback, 882 pages, 23.1 x 16 x 4.6 cm
Language: English

Is our case strong enough to go to trial? Will interest rates go up? Can I trust this person? Such questions - and the judgments required to answer them - are woven into the fabric of everyday experience. This book, first published in 2002, examines how people make such judgments. The study of human judgment was transformed in the 1970s, when Kahneman and Tversky introduced their 'heuristics and biases' approach and challenged the dominance of strictly rational models. Their work highlighted the reflexive mental operations used to make complex problems manageable and illuminated how the same processes can lead to both accurate and dangerously flawed judgments. The heuristics and biases framework generated a torrent of influential research in psychology - research that reverberated widely and affected scholarship in economics, law, medicine, management, and political science. This book compiles the most influential research in the heuristics and biases tradition since the initial collection of 1982 (by Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky).

Introduction
heuristics and biases then and now
Part I. Theoretical and Empirical Extensions
1. Extensional versus intuitive reasoning
the conjunction fallacy in probability judgment
2. Representativeness revisited
attribute substitution in intuitive judgment
3. How alike is it versus how likely it is
a disjunction fallacy in probability judgments
4. Imagining can heighten or lower the perceived likelihood of contracting a disease
the mediating effect of ease of imagery
5. The availability heuristic revisited
ease of recall and content of recall as distinct sources of information
6. Incorporating the irrelevant
anchors in judgments of belief and value
7. Putting adjustment back in the anchoring and adjustment heuristic
differential processing of self-generate and experimenter-provided anchors
8. Self anchoring in conversation
why language users don't do what they 'should'
9. Inferential correction
10. Mental contamination and the debiasing problem
11. Sympathetic magical thinking
the contagion and similarity 'heuristics'
12. Compatibility effects in judgment and choice
13. The weighing of evidence and the determinants of confidence
14. Inside the planning fallacy
the causes and consequences of optimistic time predictions
15. Probability judgment across cultures
16. Durability bias in affective forecasting
17. Resistance of personal risk perceptions to debiasing interventions
18. Ambiguity and self-evaluation
the role of idiosyncratic trait definitions in self-serving assessments of ability
19. When predictions fail
the dilemma of unrealistic optimism
20. Norm theory
comparing reality to its alternatives
21. Counterfactual thought, regret, and superstition
how to avoid kicking yourself
Part II. New Theoretical Directions
22. Two systems of reasoning
23. The affect heuristic
24. Individual differences in reasoning
implications for the rationality debate?
25. Support theory
a nonextensional representation of subjective probability
26. Unpacking, repacking, and anchoring
advances in support theory
27. Remarks on support theory
recent advances and future directions
28. The use of statistical heuristics in everyday inductive reasoning
29. Feelings as information
moods influence judgments and processing strategies
30. Automated choice heuristics
31. How good are fast and frugal heuristics?
32. Intuitive politicians, theologians, and prosecutors
exploring the empirical implications of deviant functionalist metaphors
Part III. Real World Applications
33. The hot hand in basketball
on the misperception of random sequences
34. Like goes with like
the role of representativeness in erroneous and pseudoscientific beliefs
35. When less is more
counterfactual thinking and satisfaction among Olympic medalists
36. Understanding misunderstanding
social psychological perspectives
37. Assessing uncertainty in physical constants
38. Do analysts overreact?
39. The calibration of expert judgment
Heuristics and biases beyond the laboratory
40. Clinical versus actuarial judgment
41. Heuristics and biases in application
42. Theory driven reasoning about plausible pasts and probable futures in world politics.

Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment; offers a massive, state-of-the-art treatment of the literature, supplementing a similar book published two decades ago...This is an impressive book, full of implications for law and policy." Cass Sunstein, University of Chicago Law School

"...the book should serve well as a reference work for researchers in cognitive science and as a textbook for advanced courses in that difficult topic. Philosophers interested in cognitive science will also wish to consult it." Metapsychology Online Review

"Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment is a scholarly treat, one that is sure to shape the perspectives of another generation of researchers, teachers, and graduate students. The book will serve as a welcome refresher course for some readers and a strong introduction to an important research perspective for others." Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology