Individual Forecasting and Aggregate Outcomes: 'Rational Expectations' Examined
Cambridge University Press
Edition: Revised ed., 8/12/2010
EAN 9780521310956, ISBN10: 0521310954
Paperback, 250 pages, 22.9 x 15.2 x 1.6 cm
Language: English
Growing out of a conference on Expectations Formation and Economic Disequilibrium held in New York City in 1981, the papers in this volume provide a complex view of market processes in which individual rationality is no guarantee of convergence to the 'correct' model and the equilibrium coordination of agents' plans. They reject the 'optimality' argument for the rational expectations hypothesis, opening the door to other hypotheses of optimal expectations of agents in the decentralized market economy.
Preface
1. Introduction Roman Frydman and Edmund S. Phelps
2. The trouble with 'rational expectations' and the problem of inflation stabilization Edmund S. Phelps
Comment Phillip Cagan
3. Expectations of others' expectations and the transitional nonneutrality of fully believed systematic monetary policy Juan Carlos Di Tata
Comment Clive Bull
4. The stability of rational expectations in macroeconomic models George Evans
Comment Guillermo A. Calvo
5. Individual rationality, decentralization, and the rational expectations hypothesis Roman Frydman
6. Convergence to rational expectations equilibrium Margaret Bray
Comment Roy Radner
7. A distinction between the unconditional expectational equilibrium and the rational expectations equilibrium Roman Frydman
8. On mistaken beliefs and resultant equilibria Alan Kirman
Comment Jerry Green
9. Equilibrium theory with learning and disparate expectations
some issues and methods Robert M. Townsend
Comment John B. Taylor
10. Keynesianism, monetarism, and rational expectations
some reflections and conjectures Axel Leijonhufvud
Comment Frank Hahn
Index.