Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases
Cambridge University Press, 5/20/1982
EAN 9780521284141, ISBN10: 0521284147
Paperback, 576 pages, 22.9 x 15.2 x 3.7 cm
Language: English
The thirty-five chapters in this book describe various judgmental heuristics and the biases they produce, not only in laboratory experiments but in important social, medical, and political situations as well. Individual chapters discuss the representativeness and availability heuristics, problems in judging covariation and control, overconfidence, multistage inference, social perception, medical diagnosis, risk perception, and methods for correcting and improving judgments under uncertainty. About half of the chapters are edited versions of classic articles; the remaining chapters are newly written for this book. Most review multiple studies or entire subareas of research and application rather than describing single experimental studies. This book will be useful to a wide range of students and researchers, as well as to decision makers seeking to gain insight into their judgments and to improve them.
Preface
Part I. Introduction
1. Judgment under uncertainty
heuristics and biases Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman
Part II. Representativeness
2. Belief in the law of small numbers Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman
3. Subjective probability
a judgment of representativeness Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky
4. On the psychology of presiction Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky
5. Studies of representativeness Maya Bar-Hillel
6. Judgments of and by representativeness Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman
Part III. Causality and Attribution
7. Popular induction
information is not necessarily informative Richard E. Nisbett, Eugene Borgida, Rick Crandall and Harvey Reed
8. Causal schemas in judgments under uncertainty Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman
9. Shortcomings in the attribution process
on the origins and maintenance of erroneous social assessments Lee Ross and Craig A. Anderson
10. Evidential impact of base rates Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman
Part IV. Availability
11. Availability
a heuristic for judging frequency and probability Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman
12. Egocentric biases in availability and attribution Michael Ross and Fiore Sicoly
13. The availability bias in social perception and interaction Shelley E. Taylor
14. The simulation heuristic Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky
Part V. Covariation and Control
15. Informal covariation asssessment
data-based versus theory-based judgments Dennis L. Jennings, Teresa M. Amabile and Lee Ross
16. The illusion of control Ellen J. Langer
17. Test results are what you think they are Loren J. Chapman and Jean Chapman
18. Probabilistic reasoning in clinical medicine
problems and opportunities David M. Eddy
19. Learning from experience and suboptimal rules in decision making Hillel J. Einhorn
Part VI. Overconfidence
20. Overconfidence in case-study judgments Stuart Oskamp
21. A progress report on the training of probability assessors Marc Alpert and Howard Raiffa
22. Calibration of probabilities
the state of the art to 1980 Sarah Lichtenstein, Baruch Fischhoff and Lawrence D. Phillips
23. For those condemned to study the past
heuristics and biases in hindsight Baruch Fischhoff
Part VII. Multistage Evaluation
24. Evaluation of compound probabilities in sequential choice John Cohen, E. I. Chesnick and D. Haran
25. Conservatism in human information processing Ward Edwards
26. The best-guess hypothesis in multistage inference Charles F. Gettys, Clinton Kelly III and Cameron R. Peterson
27. Inferences of personal characteristics on the basis of information retrieved from one's memory Yaacov Trope
Part VIII. Corrective Procedures
28. The robust beauty of improper linear models in decision making Robyn M. Dawes
29. The vitality of mythical numbers Max Singer
30. Intuitive prediction
biases and corrective procedures Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky
31. Debiasing Baruch Fischhoff
32. Improving inductive inference Richard E. Nesbett, David H. Krantz, Christopher Jepson and Geoffrey T. Fong
Part IX. Risk Perception
33. Facts versus fears
understanding perceived risk Paul Slovic, Baruch Fischhoff and Sarah Lichtenstein
Part X. Postscript
34. On the study of statistical intuitions Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky
35. Variants of uncertainty Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky
References
Index.