Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy

Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy

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Todd S. Sechser, Matthew Fuhrmann
Cambridge University Press, 1/16/2017
EAN 9781107514515, ISBN10: 1107514517

Paperback, 344 pages, 22.8 x 15.2 x 1.9 cm
Language: English

Are nuclear weapons useful for coercive diplomacy? Since 1945, most strategic thinking about nuclear weapons has focused on deterrence - using nuclear threats to prevent attacks against the nation's territory and interests. But an often overlooked question is whether nuclear threats can also coerce adversaries to relinquish possessions or change their behavior. Can nuclear weapons be used to blackmail other countries? The prevailing wisdom is that nuclear weapons are useful for coercion, but this book shows that this view is badly misguided. Nuclear weapons are useful mainly for deterrence and self-defense, not for coercion. The authors evaluate the role of nuclear weapons in several foreign policy contexts and present a trove of new quantitative and historical evidence that nuclear weapons do not help countries achieve better results in coercive diplomacy. The evidence is clear: the benefits of possessing nuclear weapons are almost exclusively defensive, not offensive.

Part I. The Logic of Nuclear Skepticism
1. Nuclear blackmail in international politics
2. Nuclear coercion and nuclear skepticism
Part II. Trends
3. Standoffs
nuclear weapons in crisis bargaining
4. Stalemates
territorial disputes and nuclear politics
Part III. Cases
5. Brinkmanship busts
when nuclear coercion fails
6. Think again
reassessing nuclear victories
Part IV. Conclusions
7. Nuclear coercion in myth and reality.