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The Continent of International Law: Explaining Agreement Design

The Continent of International Law: Explaining Agreement Design

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Barbara Koremenos
Cambridge University Press
Edition: Illustrated, 4/7/2016
EAN 9781107561441, ISBN10: 1107561442

Paperback, 456 pages, 22.9 x 15.2 x 2.6 cm
Language: English

Every year, states negotiate, conclude, sign, and give effect to hundreds of new international agreements. Koremenos argues that the detailed design provisions of such agreements matter for phenomena that scholars, policymakers, and the public care about: when and how international cooperation occurs and is maintained. Theoretically, Koremenos develops hypotheses regarding how cooperation problems like incentives to cheat can be confronted and moderated through law's detailed design provisions. Empirically, she exploits her data set composed of a random sample of international agreements in economics, the environment, human rights and security. Her theory and testing lead to a consequential discovery: considering the vagaries of international politics, international cooperation looks more law-like than anarchical, with the detailed provisions of international law chosen in ways that increase the prospects and robustness of cooperation. This nuanced and sophisticated 'continent of international law' can speak to scholars in any discipline where institutions, and thus institutional design, matter.

1. (Re)discovering the continent
Part I. Coil's Building Blocks
Theory and Data
Introduction to Part I
2. Theoretical framework
3. The coil sample
Appendix to chapter 3 coding rules
Part II. Flexibility Provisions in the Design of International Law
Introduction to Part II
4. Duration provisions
5. Escape clauses and withdrawal clauses
6. (Im)precision and reservations
Part III. Centralization, Scope, and Control Provisions in the Design of International Law
Introduction to Part III
7. Dispute resolution provisions
8. Punishment provisions
9. Monitoring provisions
10. Asymmetric design rules, voting, and power
11. Conclusion
Appendix 1. List of agreements in coil sample
Appendix 2. Selection issues in international cooperation data sets.