The Six-Day War and Israeli Self-Defense: Questioning the Legal Basis for Preventive War
Cambridge University Press, 2/7/2013
EAN 9781107610026, ISBN10: 1107610028
Paperback, 284 pages, 22.9 x 15.2 x 1.6 cm
Language: English
The war of June 1967 between Israel and Arab states was widely perceived as being forced on Israel to prevent the annihilation of its people by Arab armies hovering on its borders. Documents now declassified by key governments question this view. The UK, USSR, France and the USA all knew that the Arab states were not in attack mode and tried to dissuade Israel from attacking. In later years, this war was held up as a precedent allowing an attack on a state that is expected to attack. It has even been used to justify a pre-emptive assault on a state expected to attack well in the future. Given the lack of evidence that it was waged by Israel in anticipation of an attack by Arab states, the 1967 war can no longer serve as such a precedent. This book seeks to provide a corrective on the June 1967 war.
Part I. A War Is Generated
1. Who was to blame and why it matters
2. The Syrian connection
3. Egypt flexes its muscle
4. Historical opportunity for Israel
Part II. Cold War Togetherness
5. Britain has a plan
6. Southern passage
Aqaba as cause for war
7. The Americans will not sit shiva
8. How to attack
we have to be the victims
Part III. The First Victim of War
9. Turkey shoot
10. Cover-up in the Security Council
11. Security Council in the dark
12. Cover-up in the General Assembly
Part IV. Rallying Round Self-Defense
13. How to read the silence on aggression
14. The experts fall in line
15. No threat? No matter
Part V. War Without Limit?
16. War by mistake
17. Defending in advance
18. A new doctrine of preventive war
Part VI. Peace Sidelined
19. Permanent takeover?
20. Blocking the path to peace.